

## THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS OF MADURA DURING THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION 1942-1945

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### **Abstract:-**

*The arrival of Japanese troops in Java in March 1942 marked the end of colonial rule throughout the Dutch East Indies and transferred to the Japanese occupation government. From various sources, it is stated that the Japanese occupation government prioritized and focused its attention on the island of Java, so that the news of the indigenous population who happily welcomed and cheered the Japanese occupation troops did not seem to be heard in Madura. The military government structure was formed based on a military hierarchy. The highest power holder was Gunshireikan (army commander) who was later called Saiko Shikikan (commander-in-chief). In relation to the activities of the Japanese occupation government in Madura, it turned out that they did not have much to do with the political sector but rather with the economic sector which was limited to the local sector.*

**Keywords:-** Japanese occupation government, Madura, food security, local governance, Islamic policy

## I. INTRODUCTION

During the reign of the Dutch East Indies, Madura Island was not included in the policy agenda of *buiten gewesten*, or was not considered an area outside Java, however, from the fragments of the history of its population, it turns out that there are many differences with Java. This policy is contained in Article 67 of the *Regerings Reglement*, namely the implementation of an indirect system of government, especially in Java, so that it must be submitted to the native rulers. However, for areas outside Java, especially those where there was no autonomy, the government was directly implemented by government officials such as Assistant Resident, Controller and Aspirant Controller (Day, 1968, p. 418). Even since the end of the Dutch East Indies colonial government until the Japanese occupation that occurred between 1942 and 1945, it seemed as if there had never been any prominent news about Japanese activities in Madura, so that it seemed incomparable. When compared to Surabaya as one of the closest areas where the news about Japanese activities there is very intensive.

Towards the end of the Dutch colonial government in the Madura residency, regardless of whether it was a top priority or just as a complement to being included with the island of Java, it turned out that the government paid special attention to the island of Madura. This then became something *casuistic* in the history of the colonial government in the Dutch East Indies because the actual conditions and conditions in the Madura region were very different from those in Java, the implementation of the *kultuurstelsel* policy on the island of Java with fertile soil conditions and a large population. Large investment can attract large capital investment from the private sector because it is an investment that is considered to have very profitable potential. On the other hand, this condition is of course different from that in the Madura region because of the condition and conditions of the soil that are less fertile. Most likely the reason the colonial government still paid special attention and assessment to this area was due to economic factors, namely the large potential for salt-making. There is also a habit of the population to migrate out of the region, especially to plantation areas in Java, as a workforce whose existence is clearly needed by plantation companies. Another factor is the long-standing government practice of recruiting members of the *Barisan* corps from among the Madurese population. This is certainly a major contribution that could be given by Madura to the government in the field of defense and military strength of the colonial government.

One of the Dutch government's agendas to improve and improve the welfare of the Madurese population was when the government formed a commission called the Welfare Fund Commission (*Madoera Welvaartsfonds Committee*) which aimed to improve the standard of living of the Madurese population. Later, with the collection of these funds, the government estimates that in a period of 15 years the Madurese population will become highly independent residents. This would be able to ease the burden on the government in carrying out its various programs and policies because previously the implementation of the government system indirectly turned out to be ineffective and even tormented the population (de Indische Courant, no. 16. 17 February 1937).

The commission was able to raise funds totaling about four million guilders. This fund comes from two sources, namely f. 800,000, - from the colonial government which was intended to overcome the economic crisis that occurred at that time and 3.25 million guilders came from the government-owned salt industry. In its implementation, the mechanism for the use of these funds is directly regulated by the Governor of East Java Van der Plas who is assisted by European members of the Commission, namely Madura resident, head of the salt industry, deputy treasurer of the government in charge of the Ministry of Finance, and the Provincial Council. The members of the Commission who came from the indigenous population included all regents in the Madura Residency (de Jonge, 1989, p. 182).

In its implementation, various programs of this commission have shown success, including programs in the field of construction and improvement of facilities and infrastructure for irrigation canals, ports, livestock, migration, and horticulture. The program for repair and construction of irrigation facilities has succeeded in carrying out its work in 30 places which in total can improve irrigation channels for agricultural land areas covering 70,000 hectares throughout the Madura residency area. In terms of port facilities, it has succeeded in improving Prao port infrastructure and opening a new port at Telaga Biru so that trade access to and from Java, Kalimantan, Sulawesi and other islands becomes smoother and freer. The development of the livestock sector with a target of funding of 1.5 guilders is prepared to improve the quality of animal feed, intensify campaigns regarding animal health, facilitate the giving of prizes for superior bull cattle festivals, and good management of livestock trade. In the field of migration, the government has succeeded in disseminating and implementing the transmigration program, namely to the island of Muna Sulawesi and to Madurejo near Martapura, Southeast Kalimantan. Then furthermore for development in the field of horticulture, a fund of f. 28.000, - to conduct various kinds of scientific experiments in order to produce various new varieties, especially for secondary crops such as corn, cassava and soybeans. Likewise, the implementation of various programs for empowerment of tree species and trade, such as sisal, kapok, mango, coconut, orange, and tobacco, has succeeded in increasing these commodities in quality and quantity (Algemeen Handelsblad, No. 36915, 31 October 1939).

This commission program although planned to be implemented for a period of 15 years but only lasted for five years due to the sudden arrival of Japanese troops in 1942. In this case Huub de Jonge said that although this commission program was still implemented according to plan which he had arranged for the next 15 years, but regardless of the factor of the arrival of Japanese troops, the result would not be maximized. This is due to two things, the first is that the funds that have been budgeted are still considered too small so that it will be difficult to bring about a significant change. The second thing is the immature preparation factor so that the wrong target program often occurs. The third thing is the factor of the

condition of the bureaucracy whose structure is not conducive, and the fourth thing is because the planning of the programs does not involve native officials so that mastery of various aspects contained in the field is less accommodated. Then the main and most important reason for the possibility of the Commission's program failure being unsuccessful is that the programs derive a large part of their funds from extracting and charging from the profits of the salt industry so that this has led to many monopolistic and fraudulent practices. It can be said that actually the program which aims to improve the welfare of the Madurese population is financed with funds originating from the residents' own money (de Jonge, 2011, p. 192).

During the conquest of the archipelago, the Japanese armed forces were usually accepted by the natives not as enemies but as friends. Repeatedly, the retreating KNIL unit had to pass through the crowd of Indonesians who were ready to greet the Japanese in a festive manner. This warm welcome was very different from the usual hostility of the Japanese military against the Chinese population and also from the reticence of the Filipinos, who generally felt solidarity with America (Burgers, 2010, p. 276).

The arrival of Japanese troops in Java in March 1942 marked the end of colonial rule throughout the Dutch East Indies and transferred to the Japanese occupation government. This change of power also resulted in the termination of the program of the Madoera Welvaartsfond Commission in Madura. From various sources, it is stated that the Japanese occupation government prioritized and focused its attention on the island of Java, so that the news of the indigenous population who happily welcomed and cheered the Japanese occupation troops did not seem to be heard in Madura (Burgers, 2010, p. 278).

## **II. Research Methods**

To find out about the socio-economic conditions of Madura during the Japanese occupation of 1942-1945, it was carried out using the historical method or historical research method which can be interpreted as a systematic collection of principles and rules intended to help effectively collect historical source material, in assessing or studying these sources are critical, and present a "synthesis" of the results achieved. This method is qualitative in the form of literature study using written sources from the National Archives collection of the Republic of Indonesia and libraries in the form of archives, books, journals, newspapers and other printed sources (Garraghan, 1957, p. 33).

Primary and secondary data collection techniques are carried out through literature studies conducted by visiting various libraries and agencies that store written material in the form of archival material at the National Archives of the Republic of Indonesia, Jakarta, written materials in the form of monographs, magazines and newspapers published at that time in the National Library of the Republic. Indonesia and written materials in the form of reference books in other libraries. After the search for written material has been completed, the next step is to select and verify the data and compile it into writing (Iswahyudi, 2020, p.469).

**III.** The arrival of Japanese troops in Madura and the formation of regional governments the arrival of Japanese troops to the island of Madura was also on the agenda for the army's authority, which consisted of the 20th Army and the 16th Army which were directly under the order of the Emperor of Japan. Their main targets are the islands of Java and Sumatra because these two islands can inspire *Hakko Ichiu* or the slogan of the Japanese spirit as the protector of the Asian nations. The main attack on these two islands was handed over to the troops of the 48th Division by taking targets to the city of Surabaya because based on the consideration that previously this city was the former headquarters of the allied army called ABDACOM (America, British, Dutch, Australian Command) and in this city the facilities a functioning naval base belonging to the Dutch East Indies would be able to make a major contribution to a Japanese military base (Notosusanto, 1979, p. 25). Various information regarding Surabaya had previously been controlled by the Japanese because the Japanese had previously established an association of Japanese citizens under the name Surabaya Nihon-jin Seinen-kai in Surabaya on December 18, 1938. This association was actually not only engaged in the economic sector, such as the opening of trading shops, but also had the aim of carrying out espionage activities in the Dutch East Indies region (Goto, 1998, pp. 203-206).

The attack of the Japanese occupation forces against the city of Surabaya which took place on March 3, 1942 was originated from rumors that were understood by the residents of Surabaya as a form of intense training that they had to follow but in the end it became a reality. Various elements of the residents in the city of Surabaya seemed nervous and unprepared for the Japanese attack which was carried out repeatedly. Various city defense exercises as they have often been carried out are useless and the shelters that have been prepared in almost all corners of the city cannot function optimally. Then the city of Surabaya in an instant became paralyzed and made the bumiputera population as if they were at a crossroads, namely whether they would continue to follow the old government which was on the verge of collapse or would immediately welcome a new master who was considered to be a liberator from the constraints of Dutch rule. It can be said that at that time the majority of the bumiputera population cast their choices and hopes on the Japanese troops who had just arrived. On March 8, 1942, together with the raising of the Japanese Hinomaru flag for the first time in the city of Surabaya, namely at the Wonokromo bridge, the residents welcomed it by cheering the Japanese troops.

The first days of Japan's existence in Surabaya had not had a systemic impact on the economy and welfare of the city's population. Even if there were various difficulties with foodstuffs and other daily items, it was still considered the impact of the bombing incessantly.

Many factories were closed because the workers chose to flee the city. Many markets have also been closed for the same reason. Many of the transportation facilities were paralyzed due to the destruction of the road and bridge infrastructure by the Dutch troops when they were about to leave the city of Surabaya. The condition and situation of the city of Surabaya, which is usually busy and very busy with various activities of its residents, suddenly turned into silence without the daily activities of its citizens and was like a dead city (Basundara, 2013, pp. 121122).

Furthermore, in connection with anticipatory measures against the arrival of Japanese troops in Madura, Colonel P.H.T. Van der Steen as commander of the Dutch KNIL army (Koninklijke Nederlandsch-Indische Leger) has deployed and prepared a military force consisting of about 2000 personnel. This military unit consisted of Dutch soldiers and the Barisan Cakra corps which had been prepared for the purpose of defending the island of Madura from attacks by Japanese troops which could occur at any time. Until 9 March 1942 or after the news of the Dutch surrender was heard through the announcement of "Maklumat Kalijati", Colonel Van der Steen immediately went to Surabaya to meet with the commander of the Japanese occupation forces and to declare the handover of Madura from the Netherlands to Japan. As a follow-up to this surrender, the members of the Dutch military forces who were in Madura were then collected and detained by the Japanese in the city of Bangkalan, while the Barisan Cakra Madura corps was disbanded and many of its members were sent back to their respective areas. Some of the places that were used by the Japanese authorities as places of detention include the school buildings Hollandsch-Inlandsche School A1, Hollandsch-Inlandsche School China A2, Tompeng field, Kwanyar field and Madura Tram warehouse located near the port of Kamal. From these places of detention, from March to April 1942 the Dutch army prisoners were gradually transferred to Surabaya to be placed in captive camps at Tanjung Perak and Pasar Tahunan, while partially civilian prisoners were brought to Gresik to be employed to make work. Airport and some others were taken and detained in prisons located in Ngawi. The actions of the Japanese authorities in detaining these prisoners were carried out with cruel torture so that during the detention period, it was reported that two Dutch officials had died in prison, namely J.E.V.A. Slors, former resident of Ngawi and Regent of Pamekasan Raden Ario Abdul Azis (Dulm & J.R. Van Diessen, 2000, p. 132; Abdurrahman, 1971, p. 61).

Along with the fall of the colonial government in the Dutch East Indies territory to the Japanese, then Java and Madura were placed under the command of the 16th Army led by its commander, Lieutenant General Hiroshi Imamura, who immediately formed a military government. The military government structure was formed based on a military hierarchy. The highest power holder was Gunshireikan (army commander) who was later called Saiko Shikikan (commander-in-chief). Gunshireikan oversees the military government staff called gunseikanbu and is led by the gunseikan (head of the central military government). As the head of the central government of Gunseikan assisted by five departments (bu), namely the Department of Public Affairs (Somubu), the Ministry of Finance (Zaimubu), the Department of Companies, Industry and Crafts (Sangyobu), the Department of Traffic (Kotsubu), and the Ministry of Justice (Shihobu) (Kanpo No. Istimewa, 1942, pp. 6-7).

As already mentioned above, to run the government in the regions, the central government is assisted by local military government staff called gunseibu. Java Island by Saiko Shikikan is divided into three gunseibu, namely West Java with the center of government in Bandung, Central Java with the center of government in Semarang, and East Java with the center of government in Surabaya. In addition, two special governments (kochi) were formed, namely the Yogyakarta and Surakarta regions. Initially this gunseibu would be led by people who were experts in the field of government, but this plan was not implemented because the ship carrying government experts from Tokyo was attacked and sunk by the Allied navy. Therefore an interim plan was put in place whereby several high positions in each gunseibu were left to Indonesians. These positions included deputy governor, resident, mayor and police chief (Kanpo No. Istimewa, 1942, pp. 6-7).

Then the Japanese occupation government through Saiko Shikikan on August 5, 1942 stipulated Laws Number 27 and 28 which contained the abolition of gunseibu and replaced it with the formation of a sh pemerintah government or regional residency level during the Dutch East Indies government. Regarding organizational changes in regional government in accordance with this ordinance, the European government hierarchy (Europesche Bestuur) was abolished and replaced with regional government units and their leaders had been determined (Kanpo No. Istimewa, 1942, pp. 7-8).

**Table 1 the hierarchical system of government during the Japanese occupation**

Administration Unit during the Dutch East Indies period	Position of Head of the Dutch East Indies period	Japanese period Administration Unit	Position of Head of the Japanese period
Residentie (Residency)	Resident	Shū	Shūchōkan
Regentschap (Regency)	Regent	Ken	Kenchō
District	Wedana (district head)	Gun	Gunchō
Onderdistrict (sub district)	Asisten Wedana (sub-district head)	Son	Sonchō

Source: *Kanpo*, No. 1, Bulan Agustus 1942

As it is known that because the Japanese government needs something effective in the related field in its efforts to be able to make an intensive approach to the population, the position of Shūchōkan is assisted by the chōkan kanbo (Chōkan Consultative Assembly) which has three parts or is called bu, namely naiseibu (general government division), keizabu (economic section), and keisatubu (police department). In addition, there are also several additional new positions including a resident representative called Fuku Shūchōkan and mayor or called Shinchō whose status is equal to the regent or Ken. In connection with this position because it was for the purpose of winning the hearts of the Indonesian people, outside Shūchōkan were officials who held positions such as; Fuku Shūchōkan, Sinchō, Kenchō, Gunchō, and Sunchō were given to Indonesian people (Pringgogigdo, 1952, p. 27). At that time, the Shchōkan in Madura was Yamamoto Yoshiaki, who was previously Head of the General Division of Japan's Akita Prefecture. Then related to the Shūchōkan hierarchy, or Japanese government in Madura, there are several articles that become a reference, namely:

#### Article 1

Kanbo: In Chōkan Kanbo there is a section, namely the Soomuka section and the Bunsyooka section. The Soomuka section (general section) is responsible for handling various jobs as follows:

1. Employee affairs in the office.
2. Financial affairs and office equipment,
3. Affairs of reception from outside.

The position of *Soomuka* in Madura was held by a Japanese, namely Hiramatu. The Bunsyooka section (the correspondence section) is in charge of handling various jobs as follows:

1. Take care of incoming letters,
2. Copying the letters,
3. Divide the letters,
4. Take care of outgoing letters,
5. Save the letters.

This Bunsyooka position in Madura is held by a Japanese, namely Suzuki.

#### Article 2

Naiseibu: in it consists of *Keikakuka*, *Kyoikuka*, *Kaikeika*, *Tihooka*, *Tootika*, and *Eiseika*. *Keikakuka* is tasked with handling various jobs as follows:

1. Affairs of design or origins of employees,
2. Financial audit affairs,
3. General Affairs,
4. Affairs of the news regarding Shū.
5. Supervision of all Shū.

*Kyoikuka* has a scope of duties to handle teaching matters, and religious affairs. This position in Madura was held by a Japanese named Hagitani. Next is *Kaikeika* whose scope of duties includes:

1. Design and financial decisions,
2. Tax Affairs,
3. The business of holding cash and keys
4. Affairs and supervision of office equipment throughout the Shū.

This position in Madura was held by a Japanese named Yasutomi. *Tihooka* has a duty to handle matters of leadership and supervision of regional associations. Then another task is to handle matters of improving the living conditions of the people. *Tootika* has a scope of duties to handle land affairs, irrigation affairs and road infrastructure repair affairs. *Eiseika* has a special task area, namely dealing with people's health affairs. The positions of *Tihooka*, *Tootika*, and *Eiseika* in Madura were put together and run by an Indonesian named Setiarjo.

*Keizabu*: inside there are *Sangyoka*, *Syooka*, and *Toseika*. *Sangyoka* has a scope of duties to handle various things as follows:

1. General affairs
2. Agricultural affairs
3. Forestry Affairs
4. Livestock affairs
5. Fishing affairs.

This position in Madura was carried out by a Japanese named Sasaki. *Syooka* is in charge of handling industrial trade affairs. This position in Madura was held by a Japanese named Takahasi. *Toseika*, the scope of his duties includes:

1. Design affairs in Keizab
2. Preaching affairs in the Keizabu environment
3. Affairs of controlling the price of goods,
4. General affairs in economic terms.

The person who held this position in Madura was a Japanese named Yasui.

### Article 3

Keisatubu: inside are Keimuka, Toosaka, Hoanka, and Keizika. Keimuka is in charge of police administration. Toosaka; his duties are police affairs related to cases that are considered special. Ho'anka's job is about maintaining security, and Keizika's job is to take care of various police affairs in the crime department. This position in Madura was headed by a Japanese named Hugura (Kanpo, No.1, November 1942, p. 19).

### IV. Japanese government policy in the religious sector

The accumulation of the policies of the Japanese rulers in Madura, which were very selective, as can be seen from the economic and political aspects, turned out to also apply to the religious aspects which in this case had to be carefully considered. It is as has been frequently stated that all matters that have to do with the Madurese population are identified as being ready to face Islamic movements. In fact, this was also reflected in the early arrival of Japanese troops to the Dutch East Indies in 1942 where the motto that they must always uphold is to be able to cooperate with Muslims. The edict that was used as the basis was the so-called Senryōchi Gunsei Fisshi Yōkō which was enacted on March 14, 1942, which basically contained that existing religions should be respected as much as possible to maintain the stability of the minds of the people who were hoped to be invited to cooperate. Japan often propagates that Islam is an ideology that is contrary to Western culture which is identical to Christianity which is widely practiced by the Dutch and therefore resistance to the Dutch is a holy war struggle.

The immediate action of the Japanese authorities was to first establish a Shūmubu or religious affairs office whose existence was not much different from the Kantoor Adviseur voor Inlandsche Zaken (office for indigenous affairs) during the Dutch East Indies era. Then the second is to approach the ulama and eliminate the regulations made by the Dutch, namely Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indie 1867, no.114, the substance of which is to carry out strict supervision of the activities of religious scholars. This strict supervision led to the formation of a religious court in 1882, which contained a neutral government and did not interfere in religious matters. One of the realizations of this policy is that the appointment of the head is determined by the governor-general, resulting in the marginalization of the role of the leader (Suminto, 1985, pp. 29, 112). This policy continued with the issuance of the teacher ordinance (*Goeroe Ordonantie* 1925), namely limiting the movements of Islamic religious teachers, so that until the arrival of Japanese soldiers in Madura, even though there was no immediate formal decision, there was a decrease in the number of leaders.

As it is known that in Madura the hulu is a part of the departmental organization. The position of the head is to deal with religious and family matters. The relationship between the leader and the panembahan is direct rather than the relationship with the patih. Usually the head office is located in the capital city, while the branch offices are scattered in the districts. The head of the prince acts as a leader or imam in the palace mosque which is located in the capital. In the preceding office, the head of the pengulu is assisted by one or two deputy ruler. In the offices of the district head it is headed by the district head. In relation to the implementation of daily prayers, a leader is assisted by a head with the task of calling for the call to prayer, while the positions under him are lebe and modin whose duties are besides calling the call to prayer as well as beating the drum.

In the mid-19th century, the leader was appointed by Panembahan with the approval of the Madura Resident. For example, Raden Abdoel Gafar, who previously served as mantri hatib, was later appointed as the first deputy ruler in Sumenep in exchange for rice fields and yards. Then Raden Abdoel Moefit, who was originally a hatib niaka, was then appointed as the second ruler's deputy by receiving a rice field ceremony in addition to still receiving a salary of f.30, - (ANRI, Besluit van Gouverneur General Nederlandsch -Indie, 30 October 1864, no. 16). Kuntowijoyo explained that related to the development of the official position in Madura, it was categorized as a religious functionary position.

**Table 2 the position of religious functionary in Madura in 1858**

Function	Sumenep	Pamekasan	Bangkalan
Head of <i>penghulu</i>	1	-	1
Deputy of <i>penghulu</i>	2	-	-
<i>Penghulu</i>	16	1	2
<i>Ketib</i>	48	48	15
<i>Lebe</i>	182	80	35
<i>Modin</i>	701	100	78

Sumber: Kuntowijoyo, *Perubahan Sosial Dalam Masyarakat Agraris Madura 1850-1940*. (Yogyakarta: Mata Bangsa, 2002), p. 140

**Table 3 Religious officials in Madura in 1861**

No.	Jenis pekerjaan	Jumlah
1.	Barjumuwah	37
2.	Bilal	15
3.	Gebayan-kaum (pembantu kaum)	1
4.	Gebayan-penghulu	25
5.	Guru	3
6.	Guru ngaji	240 10
7.	Imam	145
8.	Jaga kubur	22
9.	Jaga mesjid	1
10.	Juru	4
11.	Juru kunci (penjaga makam)	105 1
12.	Kaji	172
13.	Kalipah	320
14.	Kaputihan (pejabat guru agama)	83
15.	Kaum (pejabat agama desa)	2
16.	Ketip	8
17.	Ketip perdikan	132
18.	Lebe	995
19.	Merbot (penjaga masjid)	189
20.	Modin	1
21.	Naib (penghulu sub distrik)	2
22.	Ngulomo	32
23.	Kepala penghulu	11 1
24.	Penghulu desa	10 3
25.	Penghulu distrik	68
26.	Penghulu agung negari	840
27.	Penghulu naib	12
28.	Sekretaris penghulu	
29.	Suhud	
30.	Santri	
31.	Suronoto	

Source: Kuntowijoyo, *Perubahan Sosial Dalam Masyarakat Agraris Madura 1850-1940*. (Yogyakarta: Mata Bangsa, 2002), p. 329

**Table 4: List of Penghulu in Madura, 1882-1942**

Tempat	Nama	Jabatan	Waktu
Pamekasan	Kyai M. Soleh	Penghulu	30/10/1847
	R H. Ismail	Penghulu	1905
	R. Abdul Gafar	Ajund penghulu	19/09/1907
	R H. Abdul Malik	Penghulu	1915
	R H. Musafik	Penghulu	1921
	R H. Abdul latif	Ajund penghulu	1921
	R H M. Abdul latif	Penghulu	1926
	R H M. Munir	Ajund penghulu	1926
	R H M. Munir	Penghulu	11/06/1926
	R H M. Amin	Ajund Penghulu	11/03/1926
Bangkalan	H M. Hafilula	Penghulu	1875 – 1883
	H. AB. Rahman Sakir	Penghulu	1883 – 1892
	A. Abdul latif	Wakil penghulu	1892– 1908
	H Ahmae Arsat	Penghulu	1894 – 1908
	H M. Samudin	Penghulu	1907 – 1908
	H M. Usman	Wakil penghulu	24/02/1908
	H M. Zainudin	Penghulu	1907 – 1920
H M. Zen	Penghulu	1871 – 1923	
Sumenep	R. Panji Miftahul Arifin	Penghulu	1871 - 1923
	H M. Soleh	Wakil penghulu	23/07/1880
	R. Abdul Mufid	Wakil penghulu	1895
	Mas Abdul Gasim	Wakil penghulu	1883 – 1923
	R H M. Toha	Penghulu	04/12/1923
R. Panji Miftahul Abidin	Wakil penghulu	04/12/1923	
Sampang	Mas Hatib Pati	Penghulu	1864 – 1896
	H M. Gasim	Penghulu	1896 – 1919
	H Abdu Rasid	Wakil penghulu	1907 – 1921
	Mas. H Abd Rasid	Penghulu	03/03/1919
	R.Aryo.AtmojoningPrang alias Ahmad Mustafa	Wakil penghulu	14/06/1921

Source: Muhamad Hisyam, *Caught Between Three Fires: The Javanese Pangulu Under The Dutch Colonial Administrative 1882-1942*. Jakarta: INIS, 2001, pp. 296-297

Starting from tables 3 and 4 it shows that the existence of the chief since the Dutch East Indies colonial era in their roles and various social formations remained firmly regulated, but from the arrival of the Japanese occupation or table 16, apart from shrinking, it was also less neglected. This was possible because the Japanese government was more oriented towards the Greater East Asian war or facing Western allied armies. The decline in the number of the rulers became increasingly apparent after the Japanese government established the Shūmuka or religious affairs section at the residency level in April 1944. The aim of establishing Shūmuka was primarily to control the ulama, so that it was possible to reduce the authority of the leader. Each Shūmuka is each headed by a Shūmukachō or equivalent to Wedana or Gunchō. Each Shūmukachō must declare loyalty to Japan and have the task of approaching and inviting the chief ruler. As one example, when he gathered to Jakarta in May 1944, all the pengulu had to become members of the Para Penghulu Consultation. Along with the Japanese occupation of Madura, on March 31, 1944, he succeeded in establishing Shūmuka and appointed Sh mengangkatmukachō for the Madura region, namely Haji Mohamad Sadaka in the hope of eliminating the competition between the ulama and the rulers in Madura (Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia, Vol II, No. 11, 01 June 1944, p.1).

Apart from establishing Shūmuka, the Japanese Government in Madura could also organize training programs for the ulama for propaganda purposes (Kiyai kōshūkkai). The training program for scholars organized by the Japanese government was first realized in July 1943 at the Des Indes Hotel Jakarta, where 1,024 scholars were gathered from 20 residencies in the Dutch East Indies. At that time, there were 61 scholars from Madura who were sent to participate in the training, while the main material and purpose was being able to become a political propaganda tool on the pretext of nationalism and state defense, especially for ulama, was named Hizboellah (Aiko Kuraswa, 2015, p. 123 -125).

## V. Japanese government economic and social policy

In relation to the activities of the Japanese occupation government in Madura, it turned out that they did not have much to do with the political sector but rather with the economic sector which was limited to the local sector. In the political field, for example, there is an edict issued by the Regent of Pamekasan Raden Adipati Arya Abdul Azis and the Regent of Bangkalan Raden Arya Cakraningrat to strictly enforce the Suchōkan Madura Order No.137 / KmK, 260, which prohibits the population from using Dutch in their daily life. -day anywhere because this is considered an attitude that helps the Dutch and also does not respect the Indonesian language itself (Kanpo, No.1, November 1942, p. 19).

In the economic field, Japanese policy in Madura was the same as that applied in Java, namely not a target for oil supply needs to support the war as was done in Balikpapan and Palembang but more focused on the supply of foodstuffs, especially rice needs. This is due to the fact that in addition to the fertile soil conditions in Java, it also has a large population. In contrast, in Madura, rice production is the lowest and is considered not ideal as can be seen in the 1940 rice production report in the table below.

**Table 5 Rice Production in the East Java Residency in 1940**

Karesidenan	Produksi tahun 1940 (ton)	Populasi tahun 1930	Produksi per kapita tahun 1940 (kilogram)
Surabaya	453.800	2.145.715	211
Bojonegoro	309.400	1.712.075	181
Madiun	356.400	1.965.233	181
Kediri	413.600	2.405.261	172
Malang	547.600	2.724.704	201
Besuki	691.500	2.078.016	333
Madura	91.200	1.961.411	46

Source: ANRI, *Indische Verslag 1940*, pp.13-14

Based on this table, it shows the dominant picture of the island of Java in this case by taking the example of the province of East Java as a guarantee of the availability of rice needs and its effectiveness for distribution with the Japanese military defense areas in other islands. Therefore, when the Japanese government had succeeded in controlling the Dutch East Indies territory, a serious policy was immediately implemented in the form of a program called Kinkyū Shokuryō Taisaku (Urgent actions for foodstuffs) in November 1943. As much as possible to increase food production which in this case is focused on the introduction of new types of rice, innovative planting techniques, propaganda and training provided to farmers (Jawa Gunseikanbu, Jawa Nankan 2604, Javanese Almanac 1944, Djakarta, 1944 p. 63).

It seems that the implementation of various programs in the context of increasing crop yields organized by the Japanese government is the first time for Indonesian farmers to receive special education in *nōmin dōjō* (a place for agricultural courses) seriously, so that they are expected to have special experiences. Actually, the program to increase food crop yields and various propaganda contents for the agenda of progress for the Indonesian nation initially showed positive results, but in its development it was thought that the exploitation of large harvests occurred, the practice of recruiting inhumane forced labor (Romusha) and The occurrence of a severe dry season in Java and Madura, caused crop yields until the end of Japanese rule did not run significantly and continued to decline.



**Table 6 Production of Staple Foods in Java and Madura during the Japanese occupation (unit: 1,000 tons)**

Commodities	1937-1941	1942	1943	1944	1945	Changes between 1939-1941 and 1945
Rice	8.511	8.302	8.122	6.811	5.600	- 33 %
Corn	2.056	2.165	1.603	1.211	900	- 55 %
Cassava	8.249	8.735	7.521	5.558	3.100	- 62 %
Soybean	301	352	273	110	60	- 80 %
Sweet Potatoes	1.309	1.312	1.083	1.498	1.400	+ 7 %
Peanuts	194	206	210	109	60	- 69 %
Potato	41	28	19	12	-	-

Source: “De Rijstpositie van Nederlandsch Indie”, dalam *Economisch Weekblad voor Nederlandsch Indie*, Vol. 12. No. 11, (Maret 1946). p. 81. See also “The Native Agriculture and its Recovery”, in *The Economic Review of Indonesia*, Vol. 1. No. 11 (Desember 1947), pp. 165-169

Along with the decline in food production in general both on the island of Java and in Madura, infrastructure development in agriculture, such as expansion of irrigation facilities, has not been carried out at all because the price of building materials such as cement has become increasingly expensive. This resulted in the interruption of the conversion program from plantation land to rice fields, which caused the morale of farmers to decline. This situation can be seen from the large number of rice fields in the villages that are not planted because the crops are often forced by the Japanese government. The case that often occurs in Madura is that many young people leave their jobs as farmers, but they do not leave their villages. Rice cultivation was neglected due to pressure from the Japanese authorities to force the surrender of two-thirds of the crop and one ox. This situation resulted in many Madurese youth who felt they could no longer grow rice and were forced to grow vegetables in their yards as a substitute for rice (ANRI, NEFIS Interrogation Report, Heiho and Römusha, Brisbane Australia 1943-1945, p. 26). The objection of the Madurese population regarding the increasing threat of hunger was the result of exploitation and at the same time the Japanese government issued a Beikoku Kanri Kisoku (Regulation for rice control) policy. In this regulation, it is legally regulated regarding the obligation for every resident to be obliged to hand over rice already in the form of rice, all of which are intended by the Japanese government to supply food needs for Japanese war troops who are on the battlefield (Johnson, 1953, p.74).

The policy of the Japanese ruler in any form when it comes to agricultural empowerment or the like, it turns out that the ones who are hit especially are the Madurese people. As it is known that since the previous period or during the reign of the Dutch East Indies, the Madurese population in their basic needs, especially rice, was dependent on the island of Java. In fact, between 1940 and 1943 the amount of rice supplies in Java could be said to be sufficient and abundant, only because there were frequent reports of Japanese rice vessels sinking from the attack of the allied forces, so that the trade in rice between residencies was tightened. With regard to the ability to empower rice production, the Japanese government divides the two residencies into the categories of exporting or those which are surplus and import or which are deficit. In this case Madura is one of the residencies that is in deficit and imports rice.

**Table 7 Rice imports between residencies (April - August 1943)**

Residency	Allocation of Imports (tonnes)	Amount of Imports (tonnes)
Banten	10.000	757
Bogor	40.000	10.105
Priangan	40.000	12.503
Semarang	8.000	4.311
Surabaya	22.000	16.290
Bojonegoro	10.000	253
Madura	22.000	5.693
Total	152.000	49.912 (33 %)

Source: “Jawa Gunseikanbu Sōmubu Chōsashitsu, Gunseika Jawa Sangyō Sōkan” (Industri Jawa di bawah Pendudukan Jepang), in *Agriculture* Vol. 1. Djakarta 1944 reprinted by Ryūkei Shōsha, Tokyo, 1990, pp. 49-50.

Starting from the food policy, especially on the need for rice, which showed a weak point, so that the Japanese rulers in Madura had time to pay attention to other primary food needs. This proves that the frequency of political threats in Madura is also low and another possibility is to predict the balance of fiscal formations in Madura. Various hints regarding information on the local economic sector, the Japanese government in Madura through Osamu Kanrei and Bukkatoo Saeirei, no.9 year 1943 (Pricing Regulation), made an inventory of the sales price list which is divided into two, namely ordinary and special. The category of the regular list is divided into groups of prices for basic necessities and subsistence. The basic needs include; eggs, vegetables, fruits, and coconut, while the subsistence needs are; bamboo, firewood, and various crafts. Then what is special is about livestock regulation and control.

**Table 8 the selling price of eggs in Madura during the Japanese occupation**

Egg type	Breeder	Market	Retail	Explanation
Chicken egg	f. 0,03,-	f. 0,04,-	f. 0,04,-	One egg
Duck egg	f. 0,04,-	f. 0,04,-	f. 0,05,-	One egg
Salted egg	f. 0,04,-	f. 0,05,-	f. 0,05,-	One egg

Sumber: *Maklumat dari Madoera Shichō no. 15. Kanpo*, No. 4, 1944, p. 38

**Table 9 the selling price of vegetables in Madura during the Japanese occupation**

Types of vegetables	Number	Price
<i>Bayam</i> (spinach)	1 kg	f. 0,06,-
<i>Kangkung</i>	1 kg	0,04,-
<i>Otok</i>	1 kg	0,06,-
<i>Lembayung</i>	1 kg	0,04,-
<i>Cipir</i>	1 kg	0,05,-
<i>Terong</i> (eggplant)	1 kg	0,06,-
<i>Labu</i> (pumpkin)	1 kg	0,06,-
<i>Labu panjang</i> (long pumpkin)	1 kg	0,06,-
<i>Lodrong</i>	1 kg	0,04,-
<i>Timun</i> (cucumber)	1 kg	0,03,-
<i>Kundur</i>	1 kg	0,03,-
<i>Langkir</i>	1 kg	0,03,-
<i>Tauge</i> (bean sprouts)	1 kg	0,06,-
<i>Tales</i>	1 kg	0,03,-
<i>Rebung</i> (bamboo shoots)	1 kg	0,04,-
<i>Jahe</i> (ginger)	1 kg	0,15,-
<i>Bludru</i>	1 kg	0,03,-
<i>Brambang basah</i>	1 kg	0,20,-
<i>Brambang kering</i>	1 kg	0,20,-
<i>Lombok besar</i>	10 biji	0,02,-
<i>Lombok kecil</i>	10 biji	0,02

Source: *Maklumat dari Madoera Shichōkan Pamekasan. Kanpo*, No. 4, 1944. p. 42

**Table 10 the selling price of coconuts in Madura during the Japanese occupation**

Daerah	Harga partai besar	Harga eceran
Soemenep Ken	f. 1,50,-	f. 0,10,-
Pamekasan Ken	f. 1,50,-	f. 0,10,-
Bangkalan Ken	f. 1,50,-	f. 0,10,-

Source: *Maklumat Gunseikan Pamekasan no. 45. Kanpo*, No. 4, 1944, p. 19

Based on tables 5, 6 and 7, it shows that the need for selling prices for foodstuffs, especially rice, was deliberately not included by the Japanese government in Madura. From the Kanpo government news information, these prices are still referring to and do not change at all from the previous price or when it was still under Dutch rule. Therefore, the Japanese government manipulated the need for rice, allegedly having a political element related to the supply needs of war troops and to deceive the rural bureaucracy, which was often rumored to be a variety of propaganda to deceive the rural population.

**Table 11 the selling price of firewood and charcoal in Madura during the Japanese occupation**

Types of goods	Price at seller's place / cubic meter	Consumer Prices	
		1 cubic meter	One bunch (1/100 cubic meter )
Firewood no.1	f. 1,25,-	f. 1,50,-	f. 0,02,-
Firewood no.2	f. 1,-	f. 1,25,-	f. 0,01,-
Firewood no.3	f. 0,65,-	f. 0,80,-	f. 0,01,-
Types of goods	(100 kg)	(100 kg)	(1 kg)
Charcoal no.1	f. 3,60,-	f. 4,-	f. 0,04,-
Charcoal no.2	f. 2,85,-	f. 3,25,-	f. 0,03,-
Charcoal no.3	f. 2,20,-	f. 2,50,-	f. 0,03,-

Source: *Kanpo*, No. 4, 1944, p. 40

**Table 12 the selling price of bamboo handicraft products in Madura during the Japanese occupation**

Types of goods	Quality	The price at the craftsman's place is (m3)	Retail price
<i>Bidik</i>	no. 1	f. 0,40,-	f. 0,45,-
	no. 2	f. 0,26,-	f. 0,30,-
	no. 3	f. 0,17,-	f. 0,20,-
<i>Tabing</i>	no. 1	f. 0,45,-	f. 0,50,-
	no. 2	f. 0,35,-	f. 0,40,-
	no. 3	f. 0,23,-	f. 0,25,-

Source: *Kanpo*, No. 4, 1944, pp. 38-39

Based on tables 10, 11 and 12, it shows that the Japanese occupation government fully understood that the way to control the colony was to continue the methods that had previously been used by the Dutch East Indies colonial government. These methods include recording and reporting all economic potentials in rural areas, both those that can directly support and those that do not directly support financial improvements. These reports did not deviate far from the existing expectations, but what is more interesting is that when the Japanese government had succeeded in controlling the island of Java, then it formed a new position, namely *Shidōin*, which served as an agricultural information service. This position was immediately placed at the lower level of government, especially in the sub-districts (*Son shidōin*) and villages (*Ku shidōin*). Officers in this new position were called agricultural mantri and agricultural foremen (*Kanpo*, No.28, 1943, pp. 14-16). Because of their presence in these lower-level areas, *Shidōin* officials are very in control of the situation and situation on the ground as happened in Madura. Related to this, it is possible that the Japanese government already knows that the land conditions on the island of Madura are not promising to be planted with agricultural commodities which at that time were superior commodities, namely rice, *jatropha* and cotton.

The reports on the condition of agriculture and plantations were used as material for consideration to determine the next steps to be taken by the Japanese government, especially to reduce the rate of population migration outside Madura Island. Considering how bad the conditions and conditions of agricultural land in Madura are, the large-scale migration of the population outside Madura can also have a negative impact on their home areas because local economic growth will be hampered. Regarding the report on bamboo plants, subsistence needs and people's handicrafts, it is possible that bamboo plants are considered by the Japanese government to be more prominent or at least very beneficial for the villagers in Madura because they can meet various kinds of daily needs. Then the reports on the sale of firewood and charcoal actually indirectly provide positive input for the Japanese government to pay great attention to these commodities. Likewise, reports related to the folk handicraft sector made from bamboo and clay are also in the framework of providing positive input as above.

In contrast to reports or information on agricultural economic products and the populist industrial sector which were not very superior in the value of the Japanese government's investment in Madura, it turns out that information on people's livestock, especially cattle, received such positive and promising attention and formation. Starting from the edicts from Madoera Syuurei number 10 and number 28, on December 20, 1944, several articles state that in relation to the slaughter of livestock, it is very tightened, such as permission from *Shūchōkan*, a place for slaughter has been provided, meat must be stamped by officers from the officer who examined the slaughter, and livestock to be slaughtered must be completely healthy and not defective. In addition, if there is a violation, there will be a penalty of imprisonment of approximately three months and a fine off. 100, - (*Kanpo*, No.4, 1945, pp. 26-27).

**Table 13 Slaughterhouses in Madura during the Japanese occupation**

Ken	Gun	on	Tempat Pemotongan
Bangkalan	Bangkalan	Kamal	Kamal, Telang
		Soca	Soca, Jadh
	Arosbaya	Bangkalan	Bangkalan, Gebang
		Burneh	Burneh, Binoh
		Arosbaya	Arosbaya, Karangduwak
	Sepulu	Geger	Campor, Kombangan
		Bulukagung	Klampus, Tabadong, Bragung
		Sepulu	Pracak, Gangseyan, Kelbung
		Tanjungbumi	Tanjungbumi, Tagunggu, Bumianyar
	Kwanyar	Kokop	Dupuk, Durjan
		Kwanyar	Kwanyar, Sumberkuning, Batahbarat
		Labang	Sukolilo, Labang
		Tanahmerah	Tanahmerah, Batangan, Budah
		Tragah	Tragah, Bajeman
	Blega	Blega	Blega, Lombangdaya, Lomaer
Mudung		Mudung, Kedung dung	

		Konang Galis	Bandung Galis, Banyubuni, Kranggan timur
Pamekasan	Pamekasan	Pamekasan	Pamekasan, Nyelabudaya
		Proppo	Proppo, Bilaan, Paneguan
		Tlanakan	Tlanakan, Mangar
	Bunder	Galis	Konang, Polagan
		Larangan	Blumbungan, Duko
		Pademawu	Jarin, Tambung, Bunder
	Pegantenan	Pegantenan	Pegantenan, Tlaga, Pamaroh, Ambender Palengaan, Putuan laut, Banyupele
		Palengaan	Pakong, Kadur, Cen-ecen
		Pakong	Waru, Sanalaut, Dempobarat, Tegangsirdaya
	Waru	Waru	
	Sampang	Batumarmar	Batubintang, Bujurbarat
		Sampang	Sampang, Pangelen, Jelgung
		Omben	Omben, Kamundung, Sogiyen
	Turjun	Darmacamplong	Darmacamplong, Madupat
		Turjun	Turjun, Kodak, Ragung
		Jengik	Jrengik, Panepen
Kedungdung	Sreseh	Labang, Labuan	
	Kedungdung	Kedungdung, Daleman	
		Baturangsang, Tambelangan, Banjar, Banjarbila	
Ketapang	Tambelangan	Karangpenang, Jelgung, Blukuran,	
	Robatal	Lepele	
	Ketapang		
	Sokabana	Ketapang, Paopaledaya, Ketapangtimur	
		Banyuates	Sokabana tengah, Batolenger Banyuates, Nagarsareh
Sumenep	Sumenep	Sumenep	Damala, Parsanga, Marengandaya
	Timurlaut	Kalianget	Tiango, Plasah, Kaliangetbarat, Esang
		Manding	Manding, Lalangon, Giring
		Bluto	Bluto, Serabarat, Kandangantengah
	Baratlaut	Saronggi	Tanahmerah, Kobondadap timur
		Lenteng	Lenteng, Daramista, Lentengbarat, Lembungbarat
	Baratdaya	Guluk-guluk	Gulukguluk, Bakeyong, Pajudannangger
		Ganding	Ganding, Rombiyahtimur
		Ambunten	Ambuntentimur, Tambaguntengah
	Timurdaya	Rubaru	Rubaru, Banasareh
		Pasongsongan	Pasongsongan, Soddarah
		Dasuk	Kertatimur, Batubella timur
		Batang-batang	Batang-batangdaya, Legungtimur
		Dongkek	Dongkek, Candih
		Gapura	Gapura, Karangbuddih, Grujugan
Batuputih		Batuputih, Tangedan	

Source: *Madoera Syuurei* no. 10 pasal 4, Maklumat no. 10. *Maddoera Shuchokan*, 20 Desember 1944, in *Kanpo*, No. 4, 1944, pp. 28-29

From table 13 it can be seen that throughout the Madura region there are 148 slaughterhouses so that it can be estimated that in terms of livestock meat supply, especially beef, Madura is a large beef producing area compared to other areas. However, it was reported that the Japanese government also imposed an obligation to hand over to the Madurese population in the form of two-thirds of the crop and to each village was required to hand over two oxen. This regulation then resulted in ineffective agricultural activities of the population. It is also told that the cruelty of the Japanese rulers in Madura related to the decreasing number of cows resulted in the practice of renting cattle for agricultural land cultivation to be very expensive, which previously was usually rented for f. 6.0, - then increased to f. 60, -. Cases like this had never happened before (ANRI, NEFIS Periodik no. 1, 7 February 1946, p. 2).

## VI. Conclusion

The arrival of Japanese troops in Java in March 1942 marked the end of colonial rule throughout the Dutch East Indies and transferred to the Japanese occupation government. Along with the fall of the colonial government in the Dutch East Indies territory to the Japanese, then Java and Madura were placed under the command of the 16th Army led by its commander, Lieutenant General Hiroshi Imamura, who immediately formed a military government. The military government structure was formed based on a military hierarchy. The highest power holder was Gunshireikan (army commander) who was later called Saiko Shikikan (commander-in-chief).

The accumulation of the policies of the Japanese rulers in Madura, which were very selective, as can be seen from the economic and political aspects, turned out to also apply to the religious aspects which in this case had to be carefully considered. It is as has been frequently stated that all matters that have to do with the Madurese population are identified as being ready to face Islamic movements. In fact, this was also reflected in the early arrival of Japanese troops to the Dutch East Indies in 1942, where the motto that they must always uphold is to be able to cooperate with Muslims.

In relation to the activities of the Japanese occupation government in Madura, it turned out that they did not have much to do with the political sector but rather with the economic sector which was limited to the local sector. In the economic field, Japanese policy in Madura was the same as that applied in Java, namely not a target for the need for oil supply to support the war as was done in Balikpapan and Palembang but more focused on the supply of foodstuffs, especially the need for rice. Therefore, when the Japanese government had succeeded in controlling the Dutch East Indies area, a serious policy was immediately implemented in the form of a program called Kinkyū Shokuryō Taisaku (Urgent actions for foodstuffs) in November 1943. In this program in essence the Japanese government tried to as much as possible to increase food production which in this case is focused on the introduction of new types of rice, innovative planting techniques, propaganda and training provided to farmers.

The policy of the Japanese ruler in any form when it comes to agricultural empowerment or the like, it turns out that the ones who are hit especially are the Madurese people. As it is known that since the previous period or during the reign of the Dutch East Indies, the Madurese population in their basic needs, especially rice, was dependent on the island of Java. In fact, between 1940 and 1943 the amount of rice supplies in Java could be said to be sufficient and abundant, only because there were frequent reports of Japanese rice vessels sinking from the attack of the allied forces, so that the trade in rice between residencies was tightened.

Starting from the food policy, especially on the need for rice, which showed a weak point, so that the Japanese rulers in Madura had time to pay attention to other primary food needs. This proves that the frequency of political threats in Madura is also low and another possibility is to predict the balance of fiscal formations in Madura. Various hints regarding information on the local economic sector, the Japanese government in Madura through Osamu Kanrei and Bukkatoo Saeirei, No.9 of 1943 (Pricing Regulations), made an inventory of sales price lists which are divided into two, namely ordinary and special. The category of the regular list is divided into groups of prices for basic necessities and subsistence needs. The basic needs include; eggs, vegetables, fruits, and coconut, while the subsistence needs are; bamboo, firewood, and various crafts. Then what is special is about livestock regulation and control.

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