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**PROJECTS OF THE GREAT POWERS AND LITTLE ALBANIA 1919-1920 PROF.  
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## INTRODUCTION

To complete the peace treaties with the countries that had lost the war and to better organize their post-war interests, prone to these interests, the five great winning powers made possible the organization of the Peace Conference, which opened on 18 January 1919 in Paris<sup>1</sup>. England, France, USA, Japan, and Italy struggled with all diplomatic and political means to influence each other in their respective interests. Thus, the main states, which were more voiced, but with more interest than others, dealt with the Albanian issue as a currency between them in order to preserve their interests intact: "on the basis of their general interests"<sup>2</sup>.

### 1. Creation of a commission for the establishment of borders in the south of Albania

With the formation of the Greek and Albanian committee in February 1919, Greek territorial claims found full support of England and France, as well as partial US support. French and English diplomats sought to change the political boundaries of southern Albania favoring Greece. The main governing body of the Peace Conference, the Council of Presidents of the Governments and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, decided at its meeting on 4 February 1919 to designate a special commission to review Greek claims. The commission would consist of representations of four powers: the United States, England, France, and Italy. From the very beginning of the Conference, it is impressed by the immediate formation of the commission to review Greek requirements. Thus, according to a "summary report"<sup>3</sup>, in the form of commissions on the Greek case, works were held from 12 February to 21 March 1919, respectively in 12 sessions. So it seems that the interests of these great powers were predisposed to solving Greek claims. Issues related to the southern border of Albania were discussed in protracted debates, respectively in 7 Commission sessions, from February 12 to March 6<sup>4</sup>. Since the first session of 12 February, the attitudes of the representatives of the Great Powers were clearly determined. This discussion began with the explanations made by Venizelos regarding the old allegations of South Albania. The chairman who led the session, Frenchman Zhyl Kambon, after making some general appraisals on the issue of races and their mixing in the East, emphasized the territories of the former Ottoman Empire. He, as the basis for the trial of the case, thought that religious affiliation should be taken: "The church was what characterizes nationality"<sup>5</sup>. While other French representatives Gout (Gut) and Laroche (Larosh) held a direct stand, without any diplomatic processing. They kept open the side of Greek claims. In the course of confronting different views, French representatives brought arguments in favor of Greek views, focusing in particular on the formation of Zografo's "Northern Epirus Autonomy"<sup>6</sup> as a demonstration of the wishes of the people of these territories to join Greece. But these treatments had touched on the discussions of other members of the Commission who felt that the epirotic government did not represent the wishes of the southern people of Albania. In these areas, according to the Italian representative, massacres were made by the most inhumane, organizing forced displacement of the population from their lands.

### 2-. Attractive Attitude of England

At this hearing is the somewhat drawn attitude of the English representative, Sir Eyre Croëe (Eir Krou). He spoke after a long silence, saying he would be pronounced after awaiting the results that would arise after a detailed discussion of the matter. But he added that "there is an impression that there is a clear sense of sympathy in these regions, especially on the coast, in favor of Greece"<sup>7</sup>. In general, a general exchange of ideas and views emerged, but in fact, two groups were distinguished: one represented by French and English delegates who seemed to be clearly in favor of Greek interests, the other against these attitudes was expressed openly by the US representative Day (Dej). He stated that it was difficult to accept the choice of Venizelos's proposed variant on the border issue, because, in his view, the political boundaries do not coincide with ethnic boundaries.

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<sup>1</sup> - It was a dawn and cold dawn, with snowy hair descending as water and folded down on the cobblestone rocks. For the most part, Paris has already felt the awful expectations of this day very much desired when leaders of the world, or at least those of the victorious world, would gather to embark on the task of drafting a peace agreement that would be imposed on the defeated. In Ke d'Orse, the adorned building of the French Foreign Ministry, which sees from the Seine River, was prepared for the first plenary meeting of peace talks, began before the winter's lightening of this icy icecream . The enclosed building with gangways, with the high heights of the high heights of the annex. Within the hallway, Salã © de la Paix with windows, the workers will be in touch with the U-sign, and every member of the delegation will have its own choice. At the ceremony, the prime minister would call on the President of the Republic, Mr ZhorzhKlemans and the President Pean, who would have the President with the US Delegation, the right, and the British Prime Minister, DailleLoord George, with his delegation, in the background. One observer, the correspondent of the Associated Press, Charles Thomson noticed one of the most disadvantaged, that is, the two presidents - PuyanarejadheUillsoni, the fourth prime ministers. Coincidentally, the correspondence with the Congress of Vienna, the conqueror, has shaped the fates of Europe. (David A. Andelman "Stronger Peace, Versailles 1919, and the Commitment to the Poverty Today", Tirana 2008, 28 (Le Debut).

<sup>2</sup> History of Albania, Tirana, 1986, p. 193.

<sup>3</sup> - Arben Puto "Diplomatic History of the Albanian Issue", Tirana, Toena 2003, p. 227.

<sup>4</sup> - AMPJ.D. no. 10, April 14, 1919, document 739 (French), copy. "Letter from M. Konya, M.Turtullit of M. Frédérus to the President of the Conference of the Paris Conference"

<sup>5</sup> - AQSH. Fkristo Dako, D.No.7, January 18, 1919. "Momorandum to the President of the Peace Conference in Paris, Klemansos," on July 20, 1919, zz. Kristo Dako, M. Grameno: "Albania's rights and research for independence and the integrity of the country. Fund Kristo Dako ", file no. 7, January 18, 1919, 1918-1920, f. 108 (duplicate) typed.

<sup>6</sup> - On March 2, 1914, in Gjirokastra, the former Foreign Minister of the Athens Government, J. Zografos, created a provisional government of Northern Epirus as a mechanism for recapturing the issue of Greek claims in the south of Albania once again in the international arena.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid, f.109

### **3-The attitude of Italy**

De Martino, Italy's representative, appeared as a good acquaintance with the problem, bringing a number of arguments against Greek demands. He seems to be closer to the realistic handling of the case when, among other things, he thought that Albanian nationality could not be easily determined, and religion in Albania was not a determining factor: "There are Catholics in the north who are Albanians," he noted. - As in the south of the Orthodox religion. Regarding the statistics, we make available to the commission some works recently carried out by Italian authorities occupying the province which is sought by the Greeks. I join with the remarks made by the American and English delegations; we must first hear not only the people concerned, but also the people who have traveled in these areas and who are able to express a serious and acceptable opinion"<sup>8</sup>. The handling of the case took on the most visible character of the fact that Kastoldi was also involved in the Commission, who argued that religious criteria should be excluded as a basic element of nationality, charging the Commission to be based primarily on language. The minutes and maps were defined on this basis in explaining the trends that showed a change in the relationship between the Orthodox and the Muslim faithful.

### **4- Two principles of US diplomacy on border issues between Albania and Greece**

While in the second session, on 18 February 1919, the US delegation referred to "a line drawn on a separate map"<sup>9</sup>. This line had two basic principles: - The first principle was aimed at preserving communication paths for Albanians and Greeks. The first were in the direction of Vlora, and the second one towards Ioannina. - The second principle was intended to divide the boundaries of the two peoples according to the composition of the population. But the American delegation seems to have come to the conclusion that the population of the northern Albanian population was wholly Albanian, and in the southern part he knew Greece, and here is Gjirokastra. But the US delegates found it difficult to be categorical. So, it was necessary, according to the delegation, that even for more general interests, nothing should be given to Greece without studying the problem in its entirety.

The English delegation was of the opinion that Himara, Gjirokastra, Delvina, Saranda were completely Greek of language and feelings, and the Florence Protocol had caused objections from Greek propaganda, and the southern Albanian population wished to unite with Greece. But, on the other hand, the British felt that in the districts of Leskovik, Kolonja and Korça the ethnic Albanian constituted the majority.

While reserving the opinion that it would be impossible to hold back the boundary of the Florence Protocol. This is simply because of the opposition that this border has had from Greek propaganda outside Albania. Consequently, they were based on the argument that there was an important part of South Albania wishing to join with Greece. The line they wanted was a combination of the wishes and interests of the Albanian and Greek population.

### **5- Contradictions between Italian and English policy on the ethnic structure of southern Albania**

Italian delegates brought arguments on the composition of the populations of the provinces that were being discussed. They referred to the statistics compiled by the Austro-Hungarian consulate in Ioannina, but also to the most recent Italian and Italian statistics of 1918. From the comparisons of the relevant documents it emerged that the decline of the Muslim element "explained to the persecution of the Epirus regime" through the change of religious physiognomy, aimed to change the composition of the ethnic structure itself. It seems that the Italian delegation was close to the truth. Here's how the technical delegation of the Italian delegation in Paris was conceived<sup>10</sup>: "I do not deny that there is a Greek population of 15,000 in the Gjirokastra district; but it is associated with a mass of 152,497 Albanians." Here the concern lies in the willingness of a desire to change and to "confuse Greek quality with that of Orthodoxy"<sup>11</sup>. Here the concern lies in the willingness of a desire to change and to "confuse Greek quality with that of Orthodoxy"<sup>12</sup>. But, according to Castro, it was impossible to change the ethnic physiognomy, because all the Muslims were indisputable Albanians, and the Christians were not Greek. The Italian delegation protected the political boundaries set in 1913 and approached a fair separation between Albania and Greece. This border line responded to ethnic reasons and only it could provide a lasting peace. While the French delegation considered a "good omen" the creation of a majority in the composition of the Commission, to make it possible to determine one of the most important provinces, such as that of "Northern Epirus"<sup>12</sup>, always in favor of Greece. According to French diplomacy, the basic criterion in resolving the issue should be only the religious element, though religious conflicts - according to her - had not been in the nature of the epirotic territory, which did not mean that religious propaganda was not urged from abroad. Hence, resolving the problem saw the religious partition. Those who were Muslims had to be on the side of Albania, while those who were Christians would go to the side of Greece. And according to this delegation, an essential problem worthy of attention was the "Saranda road"<sup>13</sup>.

### **6-Listening to the political voice of Albanian politics**

At the session of February 26, 1919, denigration of the Albanian case was even more severe. The chairman raised the question of whether the Albanian delegation should be heard, equating the representatives of the "Northern Epirus government". While the French judged that there was no official Albanian delegation, while there was no known Albanian

<sup>8</sup> - Arben Puto "The Albanian issue in international acts after the First World War. Vol. III, 1919-1926 ", Tirana, Albin 2001, p. 116.

<sup>9</sup> AQSH. Fondi Kristo Dako, D. nr. 7, viti 1918-1920, f. 1." Studim i Nikolla Ivanajt: Mandati mbi Shqipërin".

<sup>10</sup> - Ibid, p, 2

<sup>11</sup> - AMJ. Year 1919, file no. 5, f. 28 (French). <sup>12</sup>

AMJ. Year 1919, file no. 6, f. 30 (French).

<sup>12</sup> Arben Puto - History of Albanian diplomacy. Tirana, Albin 1996, p. 218.

<sup>13</sup> Arben Puto - History of Albanian diplomacy - Tirana, Albin 1996, p. 223

government. There was, according to him, only one government the fact, "which cannot be placed in equal positions with the Greek government"<sup>14</sup>. After the opposition of the American delegation, who also demanded the Albanian delegation to be heard?

It was important that the representatives of the Great Powers heard the voice of the Albanians as well. This is a historic moment to be appreciated, as it is one of the first steps in the diplomatic engagement of the Albanian factor for the recovery of the state after World War I. This is precisely the beginning of a diplomatic battle for Albania's salvation from possible fragmentation. At the session of 4 March 1919, the US delegation for the province stretching between Drinos and Vjosa made concessions, in order for the suggested line from America to meet with the proposed line from France and England. It was about Gjirokastra that the American delegation had agreed to be fled to Greece. While the border line to the north was categorical, rejecting the proposed line by the French delegation to include the city of Korça<sup>15</sup>. While the British delegation acknowledged that there were very important Albanian elements in the controversial areas from the standpoint of the number. He thought that a policy should be adapted to the interests of these lands, in order to "support the Greek requirements"<sup>16</sup> even if the population did not want to join Greece. Because, apart from other reasons, "one should not forget - the English delegation continued - the great assimilation capacity of the Greek people"<sup>17</sup>.

The Italian delegation, reiterating that the Gjirokastra proclamation was concerned with a warlike defense, considered it an instant act of a military authority. But the Italian delegation found the opportunity to unveil its program for Albania in new circumstances at a new time, regarding the care of another power over Albania, only with regard to external relations. In this focus, Italian politics referred to the secret treaty of London, which charged Italy with Albania's representation in foreign affairs<sup>18</sup>.

### **7-. The birth of the idea of "Northern Epirus" as a political notion**

While the March 6, 1919 hearing had faced the views of the Great Powers over the problems that the issue of "Northern Epirus" had been carrying. The Italian delegation compared the population of these three among Muslims and Christians, which was in favor of the Muslims, and at the same time, the Albanian national feeling of the majority of the Christian population was lacking. And that K-Albanians had "shown their relationship with the national idea and the language at a time". While, according to the British and French delegations, the statistics that were made did not give "a credible criterion for the wishes of the populations they treat"<sup>19</sup>, they were, according to them, based solely on religious and linguistic data, the first being unfavorable to Albanians, while the latter were not right for Greeks. And they had shown impressions of Venizelos and Karapano's explanations. The United States delegation was of the opinion that it could not accept as sufficient evidence the history of the Albanian state riots, which had been prompted by foreigners. On the contrary, he had based his conclusions on the reports of observers and the statistics they had available<sup>21</sup>.

It was a concluding meeting regarding the border between Albania and Greece. Through the summary report, it seems to have been a tendential treatment of the issue of the Albanian-Greek border, treated according to the wording that was introduced by the Great Powers, "Northern Epirus", which favored the interests of Greek politics.

### **8-. The issue of Albania's status**

At the end of the session, the mayor stated that the High Council initially charged the Commission with the examination of the Albanian case. In this context, British delegate Krou recommended that the Commission should stop working on Northern Albania. He found it useful to refer to the secret treaty of London, which provided for Italian control, but "left open the question of whether this part of Albania would be given to Yugoslavia or Italy"<sup>22</sup>. Consequently, the handling of the English delegation was an issue that concerned the future borders of Italy, and therefore had to pass the decision to the High Council. Another issue was that of Albania after the war. It was indirectly affected not less than once at the time of the debate over the southern border, to draw attention to the fact that the Great Powers were forced to elaborate a superstitious concept, pointing to the inability of Albanians to self-rule. Consequently, it was said that she was placed under the care of a power. It was thought that Italy would be more appropriate. This problem was not avoided by the official delegation, considering the deployment of care "as a means to escape a new collapse of Albanian lands in the benefit of neighboring states"<sup>23</sup>. So the concept of mandate was more clearly defined as a form of control that the Great Powers would set over some of the former colonies in Africa. This was unacceptable to Albanians. Immediately, they replied "that Albania would accept only a guardian who would help him to pave the first steps on the path of independence"<sup>24</sup>.

Near the Military Service of the Army) published in 1915 a brochure titled "Notes for Albania and Montenegro", confirming the Italian view. The brochure also encloses a map that speaks for race and religion, and according to her,

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<sup>14</sup> - Ibid, f.223

<sup>15</sup> - Arben Puto "The History of Albanian Diplomacy" Tirana, Albin 2003, p. 292.

<sup>16</sup> -Gazeta "Albania", Worcester, January 1920, No. 102, p. 2.

<sup>17</sup> - Arben Puto "History of Albanian diplomacy. Tirana, "Albin 2003, p. 298.

<sup>18</sup> -Ibid p. 300.

<sup>19</sup> - Arben Puto, "The Albanian Issue in International Acts After the First World War", III, Tirana 2001, p. 202 - In support of these arguments, the Italian Delegation also brings a French publication. The Ministry of War (Geography Commission

Greek residents form only two small groups in the districts of Gjirokastra and Delvina, and this is quite true "(Italian delegation to Northern Epirus) . Annex II. Poaty, f. 203.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid, p.198

<sup>23</sup> AMJ. Year 1919, file 10, p. 48-49.

<sup>24</sup> Muin Çami "War of the Albanian people 1918-1920", v. II, f. 219-220.

### **9-. Willson concept of autonomy and relation with peoples, who had been part of AustroHungary**

While wishing to the Memorandum of 14 April 1919, it required autonomy for different states that were once a constituent part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and "my view was that it was now up to the different peoples of these regions to decide how it would be their fate and their political relations. And they, enjoying the world-wide sympathy, chose to run as independent states"<sup>20</sup>. And it goes without saying that the fortified fortifications for military motives in the islands of the "eastern Adriatic coast will ultimately be destroyed by having international guarantees that disarmament will be carried out under the supervision of the League of Nations"<sup>21</sup>. Through these conclusions Italy secured the adjustment of the historical injustices that had been removed by Austria-Hungary and a series of unfair transactions. The memorandum recommended a new policy in the Adriatic archipelago and on the eastern coast of the sea, where "there were clusters that contained significant elements of the Italian population, but the pledges with which the new states were entering the family of nations will provide the freedom , development and all reasonable rights of national or racial minorities "<sup>22</sup>". And in the security of these adjustments would stand the authority of the League of Nations, thus avoiding the mistake that would consist in the creation of "enemy neighbors in the east of Italy and fueling the spirit of injustice" that had disturbed the peace in Europe and the provocation of conflicts<sup>28</sup>.

### **10 - The concept of Paksic "Balkans for the Balkans"**

While in Paksic's meeting with Wilson on 17 April 1919, the Yugoslavs openly expressed their policy through the slogan "Balkans for the Balkans", because according to them, would make possible the removal of Italian interests from Albania. Looking at this focus, the Yugoslav politics had tried to win Wilson's support over the Yugoslav customs, political and military union with Albania. But, seeing the positions of Italy and Yugoslavia, it can be said that Italy was known as the most influential political factor in the Balkans and with wider interests, while the Yugoslav state could not be the same as Italy.

### **11-. Wilson's criticism of the two standards policy**

Under these conditions, on April 23, 1919, Upschews declared the establishment of a clearly defined peace, in function of a "new rule of law and justice," moreover the Paris Conference had established peace with Austria. Wills adds that "we cannot ask her to decide on other principles, a new basis for the independence of the right of states originally constituting the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and another for the group of Balkan states"<sup>23</sup><sup>24</sup> and the line marked by the Treaty of London was improperly following a large number of islands on the eastern Adriatic coast, was not due to the fact that in these islands and coasts there were groups of people with Italian blood. But it was necessary that Italy should have a point of support among the eastern Adriatic canals to secure the borders of its eastern coast from any possible Austro-Hungarian aggression. Then, in the aftermath of war, when this military power no longer existed, according to Wilson, the new plan aimed at establishing the "new order in Europe and centered on the League of Nations"<sup>25</sup> meant that the new states that would be formed in this region would accept the restriction of the weaponry, which would avoid and make the aggression impossible.

### **12.-Contradictions between Italy and America**

However, the atmosphere at the Peace Conference was tense between Italy and the US because Italy was hurting its interests in the Adriatic. In this US commitment to solving the problems at the Conference, trying to exclude the old diplomatic rules, she had called on Italy to "let Italy (Italy) decide to be surrounded by friends, friends, showed the liberated peoples the noble places of generous and friendly kindness and the preference for justice instead of the narrow interest. " While France and England, tended to support the Yugoslav state and then use it as opposed to Italy, did not give full support to the Italian claims in the Eastern Adriatic. As Forus Ofis wrote a member of the English delegation at the Conference, Krou, Yugoslavia would use Albania as a lever "quite legitimate to disconnect concessions from Italy"<sup>26</sup>. Yugoslavia to obtain the benefits of a possible breakdown of Albania, in May-June 1919 had introduced the Great Powers note that required the Albanian-Yugoslav border to cross the Black Drin until its unification with the White Drin and hence to pursue his course to the Adriatic. But the other two grades, May 27 and June 10, repeated the alternative "if Italy

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<sup>20</sup> -La Question Adriatique "Recueil de documents officiels" Paris 1920 - ImprimerieTypographique 3, rue de pondichery, 3 (xve), f. 44.

<sup>21</sup> La Question Adriatique, a work of art, p. 46 "Memorandum of President Willson to the Italian Delegation, du 14 avril 191").

<sup>22</sup> Ibid, p. 46. <sup>28</sup> Ibid,

p. 47.

<sup>23</sup> -L a Question Adriatique, a work of art. "Declarations du President Willson sur la Questin de Adriatique, du 23 avril

<sup>24</sup> " p.48

<sup>25</sup> Ibid

<sup>26</sup> History of Albania III - Tirana 1986, p. 199.

were to be present in Albania, Yugoslavia would exercise its right to annex the Albanian territories to the right of the Drin"<sup>27</sup>.

### **13-. Tardie Project and Titon-Venizelos Agreement**

On May 30, 1919, Colonel Hauz invited the Serbian-Croatian-Slovenian delegation to a meeting attended by members of the US delegation, with the exception of President Wilson. In this case, the US delegation communicated a project to resolve the issue of the Adriatic. The main point of this project was the creation of a provisional independent state that would be a buffer between the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and the Italian Kingdom. The final destiny of these territories would be solved with the plebiscite after fifteen years. In the press this project was called "Tardie Project"<sup>28</sup>. Colonel Hauz explicitly stated to the Serbian-Croat-Slovenian delegation that the project did not come from President Wilson. But if the Serbian-Croat-Slovenian state and Italy would agree on the basis of this project, the President would not oppose it.

At the end of June 1919, the first phase of the Peace Conference was completed, addressing the North Adriatic issue that had resulted in the Yugoslav-Yugoslav conflict and the Conference. In fact, in the South Adriatic area, the Albanian issue appears again on the stage. Foreign Minister Tomaso Titoni, who had taken office, ever entered into agreement with Greek Prime Minister Venizelos and signed a treaty on July 29, 1919. This treaty allowed Italy to shake off the controversy of early Greek claims over South Albania, and Greece would be free in its claims. The two countries committed themselves to supporting each other at the Peace Conference to ensure Italy's mandate over the Albanian state and Greece "Vorio Epirus".

### **14 -.Common Anglo-Franco-American Memorandum**

But this movement between the two neighboring states of Albania, apparently isolated, had its effect. England and France, worried about the issue of the south of the Adriatic, which could emerge from influence, increased pressures against the United States and consequently achieved the common Anglo-American memorandum on December 9, 1919. The Great Powers defined a new common Anglo-Franco-American formula.<sup>29</sup> There was a special attention paid to the Albanian problem and Italy made it possible to realize its plan for Albania. According to this memorandum, Italy would receive the mandate over Albania through the League of Nations. The signatory powers "recognized the independence of the Albanian state"<sup>35</sup>, but on the other hand it was added that Albania needed the advice and administrative assistance of the Great Powers. Consequently, according to them, Albania's own geographical position and economic capacities defined Italy as a guardian of power. But, more directly, the memorandum was openly open for Italy to take on full sovereignty of Vlora and its hinterland.

Greater favor went to Greece, forcing the issue of southern borders to be left open and subject to further discussions, calling it a temporary overhaul. But some concessions were also known to the Serbian-Croat-Slovenian state, who were given the opportunity to build and use the railway route in northern Albania, coupled with a check on the River Buna. So, basically, this memorandum did not change much from the treaties before the First World War. He seems to have a sudden development because he also held Wilson's signature and his bitter taste was that he once again came up with the idea of immature Albanians to form a state, which legitimized the intervention of the international factor.

### **15 -.Italian Memorandum 9 December 1919**

Meanwhile, the Anglo-Franco-American memorandum of 9 December 1919, Italian politics did not delay and responded to a memorandum on January 3, 1920, where it required freedom of action both in the border issue and in the issue of mandate. In that regard, Italy's attention focused on two elements: firstly, top officials of the order forces would become officials of mandatory power; secondly, Italy would carry its troops in Albania for a five-year period. 14 Niti Agreement with Llojd George. But the issue would take a new turn after the agreement of 14 January 1920 between Italian Prime Minister Niti, British Lieutenant George and Frenchman Klemanso. While this agreement did not take part in the US representative. The purpose of this agreement was to regulate the "Adriatic question"<sup>30</sup> and focus on the problems that

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<sup>27</sup> ArbenPuto "Albanian Issues in International Acts V, III", Tirana, Albin 2001, p. 239.

<sup>28</sup> La Questun De Adriatique, a well-known work, p. 52, "The Tardieu Project"

<sup>29</sup> Known as the Anglo-Franco-American Memorandum, Paris, December 9, 1919, regarding the determination of the future Albanian state. Detach from this memorandum the parts related to the Italian borders and mandate:

"... 5. Italy will be given the mandate of the League of Nations for the administration of the independent state of Albania. This memorandum is attached to a project on the form of this mandate, as the three representatives below consider. The borders of Albania in the north and east will be those set out by the London Conference in 1913. The south boundary will be settled by negotiation. However, in order to avoid delaying the general regulation of this problem through negotiation, this detailed agreement may be applied temporarily:

- Greece will occupy the lands extending to the west and south of the demarcation line passing through the following points (maps of the Austrian supremacist): From Mount Tomba, located on the eastern border of Greece, northwest, at the top of the mountain Mommy to Vjosa. Therefore, following the flow of this river through Tepelena and Dobro, up to quota 98; then toward the south, passing through the villages of Lopar-Martaloz and Dhëmblan; hence, passing through the quotas 1840 and 1225, to the point located about 3 kilometers southeast of quota 1225; thence northwest, passing immediately to the north of Poljan; hence in the southeast direction up to quota 1669; hence west and northwest up to quota 2025; then heading southwest, up to the quota immediately south of AspriRuga.<sup>35</sup> The Postia Adriatica 1919-1920, Milan, f. 14.

<sup>30</sup> - The protectorate is a more stable relationship than the mandate, it is decided by bilateral agreement between the great powers (protector) and the small state (protected). ArbenPuto, the Balkan Public, p. 124-127.

split Rome with Belgrade. According to her, Italy would receive from the League of Nations a mandate over Albania, its northern part going through Yugoslavia, including Shkodra, Shëngjin and the Drin valley, while the south with Korca and Gjirokastra was given to Greece. With this agreement the Albanian issue was the worst hit and the territory of Albania was divided between three neighboring states and it lost independence. This deal brought the crisis in the relationship between the US and British and French delegations, due to various attitudes about the so-called "Adriatic affair"<sup>31</sup>, a matter which at first constituted a sharp and distinct conflict between the powers. It was about divisions of influences after World War I and Italy and Yugoslavia confronted each other.

Since this issue was directly related to the fate of Albania, we are focusing more on its handling. The January 14th project was the most inadequate variant for the resolution of the Albanian national issue. Contrary to it was Yugoslavia, which placed the establishment of the Italian army in Albania as a major problem for its southern borders. While Trumbiçi in the middle of January 1920, worried, he thought that if the project of January 14 was implemented, Albania was destined to make a point for offensive actions against Yugoslavia. While on 20 January 1920, the Yugoslav government proposed that "the administration of Albania should be left to a local government without the intervention of a foreign power". However, Belgrade provided the other alternative "if this solution was not accepted and, consequently, the repression of Albanian lands would be decided again, Yugoslavia would require its share on the northern border"<sup>38</sup>.

### 16-. American diplomacy criticism

The American government, through a memorandum dated January 20, 1920, to Llojd George and Klemansos, warned that he would not recognize any decision that would conflict with American politics and the problems created had to be regulated through diplomatic arrangements. While the prime ministers of France and England responded on January 22, a response that consisted in their justification regarding the administration of Italy, Yugoslavia and Greece was that they had not been drafted yet, but the most interesting was the fact that the response emphasized that they would not be ignored without even considering the future feelings and interests of the Albanian people.<sup>32</sup> While Waxing on February 10, 1920, he addressed the prime ministers of France and England, recalling once again his position at the Peace Conference and pausing in the January 14 accord, which he considered as a return to the Treaty of London and openly did not respect the elements of justice, and considered that the basic principle that the US had fought was that no government had the right to establish the political belonging of a certain nation. While the Governments of France and England had tried to justify the inability of Albanians to be selfgoverned and responsibility should be given to Yugoslavia and Italy. Wales, through the note of 25 February 1920, had taken a stronger stance on the defense of Albania, explaining that the division of Albania into three parts, as envisioned by the Franco-English agreement, could be accepted by Yugoslavia. But the US government opposed "a solution that could harm Albanians to make Yugoslavs happy, as well as a solution that could undermine Yugoslavia's interests for Italy's benefit."<sup>33</sup>

On February 26, 1920, the French and British prime ministers informed President Wilson of turning away from previous formulas and requesting the President's assistance to participate in drafting an official proposal in order to force the governments of Italy and Yugoslavia to come closer to agreement on the concept of denial of all previous proposals. Whereas, on March 6, 1920, Wales recommended that it be left to the Yugoslav and Italian governments to choose the border between them, but the Albanian issue was not overlooked. Stating that he could not accept any plan by which Yugoslavia could be granted territorial compensation in the northern part of Albania to invade any part that could break it elsewhere<sup>34</sup>.

### 16-. Conclusions

So, Albania was the place where two opposite systems protruded and differed from one another and we are referring to Henry Kissinger, according to him, the philosophy of the European political leader had no category of thought to understand such views. Neither the internal European institutions nor their international order were based on political theories that arose from the core human goodness<sup>35</sup>. They were further designed to put the expressed egoism of the human being in the service of a higher good. European diplomacy did not preach to the peaceful nature of states, but their propensity for war, which either should be discouraged or balanced.

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<sup>31</sup> - ArbenPuto, "Political Albania", Tirana, Toena2009, p. 204. <sup>38</sup> Ibid, p. 204.

<sup>32</sup> - The Question "Recueil de documents officiels" Paris 1920, ImprimerieTipographique, 3, rue de pondichery, (3 (xve), f.118

<sup>33</sup> - ArbenPuto, "The National Albanian," v. III, 1919-1926, Tiranë, Albin 2001, p. 249.

<sup>34</sup> L Question Adriatique -Recueil de documents officiels- Paris 1920, 3, rue de Pondichery, 3 (xve) f, 1552-155

<sup>35</sup> - The ultimate rule must be based on what constitutes true justice for each particular case and the threats are very accurate in order to develop a final peace. 2. Peoples and provinces should not be considered by governments as flocks or chess figures, even when it comes to this widespread discontinuation of any kind of imbalance. 3. Contrary to the territorial regulation of this issue, it is necessary to make the interest of the majority of the two...() (La Question Adriatique – recueil de dokuments official - Paris 1920, ImprimerieTipographique 3, rue de pondichery, 3 (xve), f. 49 (Woodrow Willson).