PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY VERSUS JUDICIAL REVIEW – A TUG OF WAR IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTIONALISM

Authors

  • Dr. Sasanka Ghosh Associate Professor in Political Science, Government Degree College, Panisagar, North Tripura, Tripura.

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.53555/12ge9516

Keywords:

Liberal Democracy, Constitutionalism, Indian Constitution, Politics of Majoritarianism, Constitutional Amendment, Basic Structure of the Constitution

Abstract

India is one of the most successful democracies among the Third World countries. The civilizational values of India and the legacy of anti-colonial struggle are regarded as the perennial source of the ideology of the Indian State. These philosophical foundations are enshrined in the constitution of India. The Indian Constitution contains the provisions which could amend the Constitution from time to time to make it suitable for the new epoch and its emerging demands. In spite of such well-defined ideological and structural arrangements, the Parliament of India and the Supreme Court of India representing popular sovereignty and judicial review respectively engaged in jurisdictional conflicts. In this background, this article explores how these conflicts expose the majoritarian approach held by the dominant political dispensations in India and how the Constitutional structure evolved the doctrine of Basic Structure by reviewing the chronicles of the several amendments since the 1950s up to 1990s.

References

1.Sharma, Brij Kishore (2002): Introduction to the Constitution of India Prentice Hall of India, New Delhi.

2.Kashyap Subhas (1994): Our Constitution National Book Trust India.

3.Austin, Granville (1966): The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation, Oxford University Press.

4.Hari Babu E. (2021): Indian Politics Vs. Indian Constitution Notion Press Media PVT. LTD

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Published

2024-10-20